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Abstract
We empirically investigate the relationship between agricultural development and
proximity to military forts in Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado in 1880.
Agricultural investments are substantially higher in counties where a military fort
is present, suggesting that military forts stimulated agricultural development on
the Great Plains. However, the reverse is not true; there is no statistical support
for the notion that forts necessarily located in counties where substantial
development was already occurring. Moreover, we found that while the presence
of a military fort has the effect of increasing agricultural development, there is no
evidence that such a presence sustained agricultural development.
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I.

Introduction
The role of government in fostering economic growth is a contentious

issue in contemporary economic development as well as the historical
development of the United States and its various regions. For instance, consensus
generally supports the notion that state and local taxation acts as a drag on
economic growth (Becsi, 1996). However, investment in public infrastructure
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financed through taxes and bond issuance tends to generally support private sector
growth (Chandra and Thompson, 2000).
From a historical perspective, there are additional examples of private
sector benefits of governmental investments. Craft (1998) finds that government
installation of weather reporting stations on coastal areas around the Great Lakes
in the late nineteenth century reduced shipping accidents, though the success of
other nineteenth century policies is questionable.

Lindert (1993) discussed

government subsidization as one of the major influences on farmland prices.
Notable among these are the various public land disposal policies of the era.
The Homestead Act of 1862 was designed to promote settlement and
agricultural investments on the American Frontier. Evidence recently published
by Stewart (2006) shows substantial wealth accumulation in Kansas, Nebraska,
and the Dakotas in the 1860s and 1870s attributable to the Homestead Act.
However, general consensus is the policy, as well as other subsequent land
disposal acts, was largely a failure, particularly in the western and northern Great
Plains. This failure was due largely to the fact that the provisions in the policy
(offering 160 acres to settlers free with the promise of a five year tenure and land
improvement efforts) attracted an unsustainably large number of small, assetlimited, farmers to the region (Hanson and Libecap, 2003). While there was
evidence some farm operations were successful for a time, during periods of
severe drought, crop yields fell and incomes plummeted. Moreover, the farms
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themselves were too small to exploit scale economies and other advantages from
large scale operations that would help them sustain operations in such an arid
region (Libecap and Hansen, 2002). Olson and Naugle (1997, p. 160) document
that in Nebraska, of the 131,561 persons who filed homestead entries in 1862,
only 68,862 received final patents in 1900. Fully 48 percent of all homestead
operations in Nebraska failed by 1900 and many of these were in the western part
of the state, west of the 98th meridian where annual precipitation falls off
dramatically (Webb, 1931).
While the evidence is fairly clear, particularly in the arid western regions
of the Great Plains, governmental efforts to transfer public land to smaller, private
concerns failed to foster sustained economic enterprise, there are some examples
that would appear to run counter to this trend. According to the Tenth Decennial
Census of the United States 1880: Volume III: Report on the Production of
Agriculture, average land values for Nebraska and Kansas counties east of the 98th
meridian was about $12.00 per acre. Moreover the average share of improved
acreage to total was 56.5 percent. However, in Arapahoe County in Colorado,
land sold for over $15 per acre with roughly 32 percent of the county’s acreage
experiencing capital improvements. Moreover, in Lincoln County, Nebraska,
another county west of the 98th meridian, 78 percent of the land was subject to
improvements and land there was valued at $8.56 per acre. Finally, in Costilla
County, Colorado, 72 percent of the land was subject to improvements, indicating
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a substantial amount of agricultural investment. While land there was valued at
$4.74 per acre, this rate was substantially larger than the average land value in six
eastern Kansas and Nebraska counties, such as Cheyenne County, Kansas where
land was valued at $2.17 per acre.
There are several possible reasons for why these arid counties appeared to
have experienced some relative success. Both Arapaho County, Colorado and
Lincoln County, Nebraska benefited from railroad access as well as river access
for cultivation and irrigation. However, neither a substantial river nor railroad
was present in Costilla County, Colorado in 1880.

There were no major

population centers to support demand for agricultural goods either. It is perhaps
quite telling, however, that Fort Garland operated in this county between 1853
and 1883.
In this paper, we address the role the frontier army played in the
development of the American West, specifically as it relates to agricultural
investment, the primary motivation behind the Homestead Act of 1862 and many
subsequent US land policies. There are at least three reasons why proximity to
military forts on the frontier would offer and incentive for farmers to invest in
land improvement activities.1 Soldiers and fort personnel in general represented a

1

As Dobak (1998, p. 7) points out, most histories of the frontier army’s role in the American West
“ignores relations between military posts and the surrounding communities: whether the army and
the market it afforded helped attract settlers; or who got the army’s money, how they spent it, and
how that affected the community.” As we hope to document in this paper, both the historical
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source of demand for local agricultural output. The historical record is replete
with stories of local communities benefitting from military expenditures on
locally available provisions and food stuffs as well as indirect benefits of skilled
brought to satisfy fort demands (Freedom, 1976, 97). In his extensive history of
Fort Riley, Kansas, Dobak (1998, p. 5) documents how farmers located near the
fort were elated by the arrival of substantial cavalry companies in 1880 as it
meant increased demand for hay and feed grain for companies’ horses. West
(1998, p. 276) writes that “troops were consumers – in their case especially
voracious ones – of the vituals around them.” (p. 276). He further added that
local “enterprises quickly struck up a dynamic give-and-take with the posts.
Freedom (1976, p. 82) suggests significant buying from local area producers
occurred after the local population and transportation network developed
sufficiently. Road stores catered to the soldiers’ daily needs and vices and also
supplied emigrants and travelers moving west. The soldiers and fort represented
the retail market for local stores. Early ranchers found a market for their cattle,
farmers for their grains, pumpkins, cabbages, onions, and other produce.” (p.
276). Such relationships were quite lucrative prospects for local farmers indeed.
In his extensive study of the role the frontier army played in the development of
the American West, Tate (1999, p. 119) indicates one of the most lucrative
military contracts was for the supply and delivery of beef, mutton, and other food
record and the supporting statistical analysis show that the activities of the frontier army did have
a substantial role to play in the frontier economy of the nineteenth century.
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stuffs to military posts. According to Tate these contracts were second in value
only to larger construction project contracts.2

To the extent, then, that the

presence of a nearby military fort stimulated demand for agricultural goods,
farmers located in these areas had incentives to increase production to meet this
demand and possibly secure military contracts, creating

an incentive for

increased land improvement activities. Until local activity reached sufficient scale
fort needs were met by producers from outside the immediate region (Freedom,
1976, p. 85).
Many soldiers also engaged in limited agricultural activities on military
posts. Tate (2007, p. 51-54) describes instances of military personnel extensively
experimenting with novel agricultural techniques including dry land farming.
Freedom (1987) documented many army writings about trial-and-error planting
and harvesting techniques ultimately published, booster newspapers and other
periodicals that were distributed in the Eastern United States and Europe to attract
settlement. Robinson (1977) points out that gardening was indeed encouraged at
forts and that soldiers engaged in such activities disseminated their experiences
through libraries and reading rooms. Forts also enhanced access to

2

The impact of a military presence on a local economy is certainly not limited to the nineteenth
century American West. Other historical examples include Dunn, Jr. (2002) documenting the
critical role the British Army played in private enterprise development after the end of the French
and Indian war in 1763. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that rural contemporary economies
in the United States are adversely affected by the closing of a nearby military bases, although there
is debate as to the long term magnitude of such impacts on local communities (see, e.g. Hooker
and Knetter, 2001).
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communication sources such as mail and the telegraph.

Freedom (1976)

identified agicultural knowledge as the significant contribution of military
agriculture in the settlement of the northern Plains. Dobak (1998, p. 61, 63) also
offers examples of military personnel remaining in settlements near the forts
where they were stationed after their terms of enlistment ended to take up many
vocations, including private farming activities.

One might expect increased

investment activities in areas near forts where successful and novel cultivation
activities were proven beneficial and where additional private farming activities
took place by retiring army personnel.
Finally, a military presence likely encouraged investment by deterring
farm property pilfering and destruction by Indian raiders attempting to prevent
white settler encroachment on their land or outlaw bandits.

As Hart (1963, p.

118) describes, “Regardless of where they were, or why, the citizens of nineteenth
century America felt the deserved protection from the Army.” Freedom (1987)
documents several instances where several forts were established in the Dakota
Territories largely to protect white settlements.3
The economic history of the American west is largely a story of public
land disposal, westward migration, and, importantly, the establishment and
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For example, according to Freedom (1987), Fort Dakota, near present day Sioux Falls, South
Dakota and Fort Ellis near Bozeman, Montana were established largely to protect settlement in
those regions. While these areas are outside our study area due to the fact that neither the Dakotas
nor Montana were states and thus we have no county level data for the period of focus here, these
examples highlight the importance of frontier forts as protectors.
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enforcement of private property rights, a stark contrast with the economic history
of the American east (Anderson and Hill, 1975, 1990; Anderson and Leal, 1991).
A focus on property right protection is therefore germane. Secure property rights
increase individual incentives to invest in innovation and production because of
the reduced dissipation of economic rents through theft, arbitrary confiscation,
contractual holdup, or other rent-seeking activities (North;1987, 1990). Many
studies support the idea that secure and enforceable property rights, whether
governmental or privately developed institutions, promote economic growth
(Thorstensson, 1994; Domcer, 2007) and investment, both internationally (Besley,
1995), and within the context of the nineteenth century American west (Anderson
and Hill, 2004, p. 22; Kanazawa, 2006).
The role of the frontier army as protectors of private property, however, is
not immediately obvious. It does appear to be the case that a number of military
forts, such as Fort Kearny in Nebraska, were established to protect emigrants
moving west along the Platte River road from Indian raids, outlaws, etc. (Frazier,
1988, p. 87). That said, the task of establishing federal policing powers without
encroaching on citizens’ civil liberties has pre-occupied legislators and policy
makers since the inception of the United States. The Judiciary Act of 1789 was
the first attempt to delineate the relationship between local marshals and federal
enforcement of law. With respect to the nineteenth century American west, the
1878 amendment to that year’s military appropriations act advanced by
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Representative William Kimmel of Maryland severely restricted military
involvement in civil enforcement and established penalties for military personnel
who stepped beyond the delineations established by the act.4 These restrictions
were not without controversy. In 1871 Secretary of War William Belknap cited
many examples of how soldiers had coordinated with local law enforcement to
make arrests, detain prisoners, prevent thievery, etc. (Tate, 1999, p. 3). Indeed,
speaking of military officers’ attitudes towards their delineated federal powers to
intervene in civil affairs, Tate (1999) describes:
At times, the majority preferred a loose interpretation of that
power, thus allowing them to arrest and hold small numbers of
outlaws and rioters for short periods of time. They well recognized
that the more remote areas of the West lacked sufficient civilian
law enforcement personnel to deal with some of these problems.
Even under the threat of possible legal reprisal for arresting
civilians, most military officers carried out their duties with
dedication.” (p. 110).
In short, one would expect a military presence could reasonably be seen as a
source of civil protection, at least for transportation routes, thereby reducing the
threat of rent dissipation and fostering investment activities.
While the three reasons detailed support the notion that establishment of
military installations in the American west tends to support economic growth and
investment, it could be that such establishments hindered local and regional
growth and investment, particularly in agriculture.
4

Dobak (1998, p. 1977)

In effect, the act restricted military action to exceptional cases of insurrection or riot, the
endangerment of public (not private) property, and efforts to disrupt federal mail service.
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articulates this view well by pointing out that the military did sequester acres of
land for military purposes, closing many areas to settlement and homesteading
and limiting the tax base for local government. These activities likely had a
detrimental impact on private sector activities.
The opposing views make the question of the frontier army’s role in the
development of the west is an empirical one. The paper is organized as follows. In
sections II and III we describe the scope of the study, empirical model variables
and data sources. In section IV we address specifics element of the estimation
procedure. In section V we present the model results and in section VI we
conclude and offer avenues for future research.
II.

Nature and Scope of Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis conducted here uses county data mostly from tables

published in the Tenth Decennial Census of the United States of 1880 (Census),
compiled by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR), and focuses on the region defined by the states of Kansas, Nebraska and
Eastern Colorado (about 179 total counties).

Our dependent variable is the

proportion of improved county acreage, defined as ACIMP, obtained from the
Census. Since the historical census of the United States for 1880 does not appear
to have tracked a direct measure of agricultural investment, ACIMP serves as a
proxy for investment in that it measures acreage subject to improvement for
cultivation purposes, such as the clearing of brush and trees, leveling/landscaping
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of land for growing crops, land tillage, irrigation networks, etc. Such activities
require a substantial amount of labor and capital investment. Hence, this variable
is a reasonable measure of the capital and labor investment effort undertaken by
homesteaders. If a military presence does indeed support property right protection
and afford a ready market for agricultural output, one would expect a greater
degree of such investment in those areas were a fort is located.5
As stated earlier, the empirical analysis conducted here focuses on the
region defined by the states of Kansas, Nebraska and Eastern Colorado. All three
were states by 1880 and therefore county level census data is available. There
appears to be substantial interest in the economic development of the American
mid-West and Plains region evidenced by recent scholarship (Cunfer, 2005;
Stewart, 2006). There may be several reasons for this interest. Prior to the
outbreak of the Civil War, this region was largely considered uninhabitable and of
little economic value. An early American explorer of the west, Stephen H. Long,
described this region as “wholly unfit for cultivation…by a people depending on
agriculture for their subsistence” and labeled the region “the Great American
5

It may also be reasonable to suggest farm land values as an alternative measure of the economic
impact of a frontier fort in that one would expect such land to be of higher value as potential
settlers and/or land speculators bid up land prices for these attractive tracts of land if a fort affords
a readily accessible market for agricultural goods as well as property right protection.. However,
given that it is equally reasonable to hypothesize that a military presence would stimulate
investment in land improvements, and given that several recent studies, notably Craig, Palmquist
and Weiss (1998) and Decker and Flynn (2007) have found evidence that land values are strongly
linked to acres improved, we might encounter an endogeneity problem were we to focus on land
values directly. As we will see, we do find evidence that proximity to military establishment do
stimulate investment in land improvements. Hence, indirectly, our findings support the notion that
such proximity will also stimulate land values.
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Desert.”6 Beginning in the 1860s, this perception changed dramatically due to the
passage of the Homestead Act, improved farming technology and transportation
infrastructure, and increased efforts by “boosters”. This dramatic change in
perception resulted in an influx of citizens from the densely populated cities of the
east.
This region developed into an agricultural economy that became a major
contributor to the economic growth and development of the United States in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The combination of rapid world
population growth and urbanization created substantial increases in world demand
for food products, notably wheat (White, 1993, p. 244). As a result wheat became
the major commodity in this region. In 1882, Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakota
territories accounted for 12 percent of total wheat production in the United States.
By 1900, they accounted for 27 percent. By the second decade of the 20th
century, the United States, for the first time in its history, became a creditor
nation. While manufacturing and other sectors certainly played a role in this,
agriculture’s role in this favorable trade balance cannot be overlooked (Walton
and Rockoff, 1998, p. 460-61). This region has remained a major center of
agriculture to this day.
Finally, the focus on this region is advantageous from an econometric
perspective. Answering whether, and to what extent, forts impacted agricultural
6

This excerpt has been quoted much in American history. This quote was taken from Hine and
Faragher (2000, 160).
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investment requires that fort location be exogenous; that is, the presence of a
military establishment induces agricultural investments, not that fort sites were
selected in areas where land improvements have already taken place. The idea
that forts may have been largely built in places that could best serve pioneers
immigrating to westward to California or the Oregon Territories supports the
notion that settlement and agriculture in the mid-West and Plains region largely
followed after such fort installation reduces the potential for endogeneity. This
said, below we do test for this potential reverse causality econometrically below.
The time period selected is worth noting as well. After the end of the
Civil War, union army personnel were by-in-large redeployed to western regions
of the nation to support, among other things, westward migration and protect
settlers and capital (largely railroad and telegraph infrastructure) from Indian
raids. Most territories in the Plains region had not yet, or had only recently
achieved, statehood making reliable data from the 1860 and 1870 censuses largely
incomplete. From 1890 through 1900, it became clear the end of the Plains Indian
War was coming and many frontier military forts were being abandoned or
demolished as the US frontier army was largely re-deployed to the nation’s
coastal areas for more rapid deployment overseas.7 As a result, to detect any
potential link between economic development and agricultural development and
7

Also with the end of frontier hostilities, the army began to cut down on enlistments, not fill any
vacant military positions in frontier regions, and consolidate military operations in a few
remaining western forts. This last point is of potential interest as a future research directive since it
is not readily clear what criteria was applied to select forts for closure and forts for consolidation.
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the frontier Army, the 1880 period would offer the most reasonable time frame to
focus upon.
III.

Model Variables and Data Sources
The incentives to invest in agricultural land improvements are determined

by the prevailing cost and demand considerations in the market for agricultural
goods. On the cost side, land better suited for agricultural development will
generate more efficient production and therefore offer homesteaders an
opportunity to produce more efficiently (cost-effectively) than land less well
suited for agricultural development. As a measure of the productive capacity of
land, we construct a variable, YLD, again using data from the Census, which
measures the ratio of bushels of agricultural crops produced to total acres planted
for each county.8 We would expect more investment in improved acres to be
associated with greater productive yield of the land. Moreover, easier access to
markets as well as sources of productive capital can generate efficiencies in
production. To address this, we include two variables. The first is a measure of
the ratio of manufacturing employment to total population in a given county,
MAN_EMP/POP, both taken from Census. Much of the manufacturing activities
of this period and region were operations that supported the capital needs of local
farmers, such as blacksmithing. The second variable, RR, indicates the presence
8

The agricultural products used in this calculation were barley, buckwheat, corn, oats, rye, and wheat. It
should be noted that this variable could also be influenced by the acres improved variable, ACIMP, in that
higher productivity is likely influenced by the degree of improvements to land. This potential endogeneity
will likely bias our statistical result. Therefore, our econometric procedures will address this issue.
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of a railroad line and is equal to one if the county in question contained a railroad
passing through it as of 1876. This data was generated by the authors from
detailed inspection of state maps in the year 1876 as published by Rand McNally
(see Table 1 for details). In both cases, we would expect greater improvements to
land due to more manufacturing activities and the presence of a rail line.
With respect to market demand incentives to invest in agriculture, we
include two population variables, POP/FARMS, and POPST/FARMST. The first
variable is the ratio of county population to total number of farms. We expect that
the greater the local demand for farm output (i.e. the greater the population
relative to producers), the more investment in agricultural production will take
place. It is also possible that some farm operations looked beyond the local
market (as defined by county delineation). To proxy for farms in a given county
having a wider market orientation we include the ratio of that population in a
given state net of the population in county i, to total farms in the state, net of
farms in a given county i.

Again, we would expect a positive effect on

agricultural investment here as well.
As for the effect of proximity to a frontier army fort, we generated two
dummy variables, FORT, and NEARFORT. The FORT variable indicates the
presence of at least one operating military fort in a given county i in 1880. This
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data was compiled from maps published in Hart (1963, 1964).9 In addition, we
constructed a variable NEARFORT which indicates, for a given county i, at least
one fort located in a county adjacent to that county. In both cases, if proximity to
a military fort stimulates agricultural investment, we would expect to see a
positive effect.
In addition, we also include two state dummy variables indicating Kansas
or Nebraska to capture state-specific elements that might otherwise be omitted by
other variables. Recalling that our dataset covers these states plus eastern
Colorado, it may be that there are certain state characteristics unique to each that
might support agricultural land development. For instance, the fact that in 1880
Kansas had more population centers and therefore achieved statehood before
Colorado may have given state legislators more time to influence agricultural
development relative to Colorado. Once the various data sources are linked
together, we end up with a 163 observations.
IV.

Empirical Model Specification

9

Indeed, compiling this data was actually a bit more complicated. The maps published by Hart
give a rough location of military forts and smaller military camps and the years in which these
forts were in operation. Once those forts that were in operation in 1880 were identified, we
conducted internet searches on each fort to pinpoint specific county location. At the time we also
attempted to find data on garrison size in this period hypothesizing that not only proximity to a
fort but the relative size of the military personnel present would also impact investment decisions.
However, no such data was available either from individual internet sites nor from for sources,
such as various government documents that addressed military budgets of the time. That said, we
did take care to only include military forts and to exclude military posts, which as a rule tended to
be smaller, of then with only one or two solders deployed at a given time and were more
temporary in nature and construction.
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When implementing our empirical model, we could have used standard
OLS, modeling the natural log of ACIMP as a function of the variables discussed
above. However, doing so does not take into account that ACIMP is essentially
bounded between zero and one since it is not possible to improved more acres in a
county than are present.10 Hence, the resulting estimators cannot be assured unbiased and consistent. We therefore adopt a modeling procedure which explicitly
takes this characteristic into account.11 Specifically, we assume, as is commonly
done, ACIMP is a conditional probability that follows a logistical distribution.
Using the independent variables discussed above, we estimate the following
equation:

⎛ ACIMPi ⎞
ln ⎜
⎟ = β 0 + β1 ln(YLDi ) + β 2 ln( POPi / FARMSi )
⎝ 1 − ACIMPi ⎠
+ β3 ln( POPSTi / FARMSTi ) + β 4 ln( MAN _ EMPi / POPi )
+ β5 RR1876i + β 6 FORTi + β 7 NEARFORTi
+ β8 DMYNE + β9 DMYKS + ei ,
(1)

10

A reasonable alternative specification may have been to model acres improved as a function of
total acres plus the additional variables described above. This, however generated some statistical
problems as total acres is highly correlated with some other model variables, such as population
and agricultural yields. This potential multicollinearity could significantly bias our resulting
standard errors. Modeling ACIMP as we have mitigates multicollinearity concerns (see Table 2).
11
The procedure employed here comes largely from Greene (1993, p. 653-654) who provides a
detailed background on the application of regression analysis to proportional data.
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where we use the log-form of our continuous independent variables. This was
done because this specification generated the most desirable statistics.12
Under the logistic distribution assumption, so long as ACIMP lies between
0 and 1, as is the case in our dataset, equation (1) can be estimated via OLS.13 The
main econometric problem remaining, however, is that the variance of the
resulting estimated residuals from such a regression are, by construction,
heteroscedastic. To correct for this, we follow procedures detailed in Greene
(1993, p. 654) and first estimate our model via OLS to obtain consistent estimates
of the model parameters. The fitted equation is then used to construct weights
that correct the heteroscedasticity problem.14 Equation (1) is then re-estimated via
weighted least squares, the results of which are presented in Table 3.

12

This also had the added benefit of allowing the resulting coefficients on our continuouslydefined variables to be interpreted, with some minor modification, as elasticities. To be sure, there
are other legitimate functional forms that could have been estimated. Indeed, we investigated
anther common form, the semi-log functional form whereby our continuous independent variables
were included. This model produced higher regression errors and other less-desirable model
statistics. Hence, we opt to focus on the log-linear form here. Results from this alternative
specification are available upon request from the authors.
13
To see this, let y=LOSS/TONS. Then if y, conditioned on model variables, x, follows the
⎛ y ⎞
exp(x ' β)
logistic distribution, y =
. After some algebra, we have ln ⎜
⎟ = x 'β .
1 + exp(x ' β)
⎝1− y ⎠
14

For the Logistic model, the error term ε i is heteroscedastic with a variance equal to

1
where Λ is the ACIMP and nt is the number of “trials” in county i. Notice
nΛ i (1 − Λ i )
the source of the heteroscedasticity in that the variance is not constant but rather changes with
Var (ε ) =

ACIMP. Hence, the weights used to estimate (1) are wi = ni Λ i (1 − Λ i ) . Since Λ i is not known,
we adopt the following two step procedure where we first estimate (1) via OLS and then calculate
the fitted values of ACIMP: Λ i , which are used to construct wt and then used to re-estimate (1).
The number of “trials” nt, which in our case is the total number acres in a county. Again, see
Greene (1993, p. 653-654) for further discussion of the logistic model.
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Another important econometric issue to address is the potential
endogeneity between ACIMP and YLD.

Productive yields would likely be

higher with land improvements. To address this, we follow standard convention
and estimate equation (1) via two-stage least squares (TSLS), instrumenting the
YLD variable.15
Finally, multicollinearity is a potential issue in any econometric exercise.
For example, it may be that forts were located in close proximity to rail lines,
suggesting a potentially high correlation between those two variables which could
bias these variables’ estimated standard errors upwards.

Table 2 reports

correlation coefficients between the independent variables defined in equation (1).
Based on these statistics, there is little worry about statistical correlation between
variables, lessening the collinearity concern.16
15

Pendyck and Rubinfeld (1998) or Greene (1993) offers a good review of the TSLS procedure.
In addition to the independent variables listed above, we include additional regressors necessary to
identify the YLD equation in the initial stage of the TSLS procedure. In this equation, we include
several regional variable indicators such as counties located east of the 98th meridian (for Kansas
and Nebraska) and whether or not a county had a river passing through it. One would expect
yields to be effected by lands east of the 98th meridian since rain fall is substantially higher in
these locations relative the more arid conditions west of this delineation (see Webb, 1931).
Moreover, if a county had a river passing through it might indicate easier access to water resource
necessary for irrigation and cultivation. This too should directly impact yields. Finally, we include
a variable: ACRES/FARMS, which measures the average size farm in a given county. To the
extent that there are scale economies, one might expect productive yields to be higher on larger
farms. These initial stage results, not presented here, are available upon request from the authors.
It should be noted that an alternative approach to at least lessening the concern over endogeneity
would be to obtain lagged YLD data from the 1870 census. Unfortunately, no such data is
available.
16
That said, two observations are worth highlighting. First, the correlation between RR1876 and
YLD is relatively high, perhaps suggesting that yields benefited from rail access making it easier
to ship inputs into the area and product out. Since RR1876 is included in the initial stage
modeling YLD in the TSLS procedure however, this correlation is less of an issue. Second, one
may be concerned with potential endogeneity between the establishments of forts and population.
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V.

Results

The TSLS results are presented in Table 3. The regression results appear
to be explaining about 68 percent of the dependent variable and the F-statistic
implied that we can comfortably reject the null hypothesis that our coefficients are
jointly equal to zero.
The key variable in our model is FORT, which proves to have a positive a
statistically significant determinant of ACIMP, suggesting that, after controlling
for other influences, greater capital investment and labor effort occurred in those
counties where a fort was present. In terms of magnitudes, the results indicate
that the presence of a nearby fort alone induces an increase in the proportion of
improved acres of about 1.24 percent on average, relative to those counties that
did not contain a fort.17 In light of previously published evidence by Craig,
Palmquist, and Weiss (1998) and Decker and Flynn (2007), indicating that land
values are significantly increased when land improvements occur, we conclude
that forts offer incentives to land improvement behavior, and therefore tend to
increase land values as well.

Specifically, one reason that the frontier army built forts in areas of greater settlement. While this
is a possibility, there is little correlation between county population and the FORT variable.
Second, Freedom’s (1987, p. 10) research states that in many cases fort construction generally
preceded settlement in many frontier regions.
17
This effect was calculated in the following way. Since FORT is binary, we have for the Logit
1
model, Δy = ACIMPFORT =1 − ACIMPFORT = 0 = −0.339
= 0.584 . To find the percent by which
+1
e
ACIMP is impacted, we follow convention and evaluate this percentage at the mean value of our
dependent variable. Specifically, we calculate: Δy / 47.1% = 1.24 .
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The results also suggest closer proximity to a fort is more likely to induce
increased agricultural development, evidenced by the smaller coefficient on
NEARFORT. Also, at conventional significant levels, we cannot conclude that a
fort located adjacent to a particular county induces more agricultural activity,
although it is worth noting that the p-value is .126, “close” to the standard 10
percent significance level.
The other variables in the model generally come through as expected.
Land more conducive to agriculture, as proxied by YLD, tends to induce greater
land improvement activity. Indeed, a ten percent increase in YLD results in a
3.97 percent increase in ACIMP. 18 Moreover, those counties that have rail access
by 1880 also appear to experience greater agricultural land improvements.
While the coefficients are as expected on ln(POP/FARMS) and
ln(MAN_EMP/POP), neither is statistically significant at conventional levels.
Interestingly, larger state population relative to farms does not appear to prompt
more land improvements in counties, suggesting that by 1880 many farming
operations were inclined to look beyond local markets.

18

To calculate an elasticity for continuously defined variables, for the general logistic
⎛ y ⎞
model: ln ⎜
⎟ = β ln x , the resulting elasticity is β (1 − y ) . Again, following convention we
⎝ 1− y ⎠
evaluate this elasticity at the mean of y. For the elasticity of YLD on ACIMP, we calculate
0.750*(1 − 0.470) ≈ 0.397 .
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Is the location of a fort endogenous to land improvements? The issue of

how fort sites were determined is still open. One might suggest that forts were
located in areas where some farming/ranching activity had already taken place.
Such regions would be a potential source for food and other provisions required
by the stationed garrisons, although correlation statistics do not support this
assertion.

That said, given that the underlying assumption in our model

necessarily assumes that forts impact land improvement and not vice versa, it is
worth addressing whether or not there is reason to suggest fort site selection
depended on land improvements. The issue of site selection is complex and we
do not presume to model the process completely, though we do offer some
evidence that dampens the concern over reverse causality. To address this issue
empirically, we collected data on the proportion of acreage improved to acres
from the Ninth Decennial Census of the United States of 1870, compiled by
ICPSR. We then created a binary variable, again using data from Hart (1963,
1964) that equals 1 when a military fort was constructed after 1870, 0 otherwise.
We then estimated the following model assuming a binary Probit19:
Pr( FORT _ POST 1870 = 1) = Φ (α + β1 ln( ACIMP1870)
+ β 2 ln( ACIMP / ACIMP1870) + β 3 DMYKS ).

(2)

19

Note that we did lose data from Colorado as it was not a state in 1870 and we thus did not have
county level data. This results in a reduced sample size to about 106 observations.
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If fort site was sensitive to improved acreage, as well as any improved acreage
over the decade of the 1870s, we should expect positive and significant
coefficients on β1 and β2. The results are presented in Table 4. Neither variable
appears to be a determining factor of fort site location, calling into question
concerns that forts were selected in response to agricultural investment already
taken place.20
Did a fort sustain agricultural development? We began this essay by

discussing the relative value of governmental involvement in economic
development and, in particular, the Homestead Act of 1862. The suggestion was
that, while the act, and the several other land disposal acts that followed were
largely a failure because they fostered small scale farming on land not suited for
such operations, perhaps federal efforts to support farm success through
settlement protection, etc., may have played a role in fostering such development.
As the results above highlight, the establishment of military forts did foster land
development.
However, these results do not offer clues as to the impact that military
forts may have played in sustaining such agricultural efforts. This issue is
important since the failure of a military presence to translate into sustained
20

Note that the dummy variable for Kansas was included to capture any potential influence state
political and other social differences may have played in fort location. Also note that the results
are substantively the same either the level of acres improved in 1870 or the growth in acres
improved is dropped from equation (2). Clearly, these results offer little insight as the cause of
fort site selection. While beyond the scope of this study, such an analysis my be a fruitful avenue
for future research.
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growth, further calls into question 1) whether or not the establishment of forts
simply delayed the inevitable failure of the land acts and 2) whether or not the
establishment of forts caused too much agricultural investment to take place,
suggesting a socially inefficient commitment of agricultural capital investment
and labor effort.
In this section, we address the issue of whether or not a fort constructed
prior to 1880 but subsequently closed prior to 1890 resulted in sustained
agricultural growth in both land improvements and number of farms.

This

hypothesis tests whether capital deepening in land improvement prompted by the
presence of a fort in 1880 was sufficient to sustain growth even after the military
(and the associated federal spending that supported the garrisons) exited the area.
If the answer is “yes”, such development was in fact sustained, then one would be
inclined to conclude that the frontier army did create circumstances that supported
development, perhaps mitigating the criticism of the Homestead Act of 1862. If,
however, the answer is “no” one might conclude the frontier army only delayed
the inevitable, that homesteading in certain regions was simply untenable.
We constructed two growth models to address this issue. The first models
the growth in ACIMP between 1880 and 1890. The second models the growth in
FARMS between 1880 and 1890.

Data for 1890 on land improvements,

ACIMP1890, 1890 farms, FARMS1890, county and state (net of county i) level
population for 1890, POP1890 and POPST1890, and manufacturing employment
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in 1890, MAN_EMP1890, were all taken from the Eleventh Decennial Census of
the United States of 1890, compiled by ICPSR. We constructed FORT_PRE1890,
again from Hart (1963, 1964), which indicates those forts which were in operation
in 1880 but subsequently closed prior to 1890. Indeed, most forts in our dataset
were indeed closed by 1890. We also created a variable, RR_ADDED, which is a
dummy variable indicating if a county that did not have a rail line in 1876 did
receive such a line by the 1890s.21
We estimated the following equation via TSLS:
ln(X1890i / X i ) = αβ1 ln(YLDi ) + β2 ln(POP1890i / POPi )
+β3 ln(POPST1890i / POPSTi )
+β4 ln(MAN _ EMP1890i / MAN _ EMPi ) ,
+β5 RR _ ADDEDi + β6 FORT _ PRE1890i
+β7 DMYKS + β8 DMYNE + ei

(3)
where Xi equals either ACIMP or FARMS for a given county i.22 We would
expect a positive coefficient on the two population growth variables as well as the
manufacturing employment growth variable. We also would expect continued
21

Annual data on rail construction by county is not available. To get a picture of the progression
of rail construction through the period of interest we exploited data from the following web site
http://www.livgenmi.com/1895/, which supplies data on the location of rail lines by state and
county for the year 1895. While there may be some concern that we have counted counties that
may have had rails by 1895 but not as of 1890, it is generally accepted that most of the major rail
lines were build by the 1890s. Hence, while available data does not exist to verify with certainty,
any bias in our data is likely small.
22
Note that we still estimate our equation (3) using TSLS owning to the endogeneity of YLD
being driven by locational and land attribute factors (such as the presence of a river in the county).
We also account for potential heteroscedasticity using White’s estimator. The results are not
substantively different from OLS.
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growth due to the spreading of the railroad network. We would expect a negative
coefficient on YLD (i.e. productive yields as of 1880 as a proxy for land quality)
under the hypothesis that, as a measure of land quality, the most productive acres
of land would be used for production first.

Also, we control for potential

differences across states. Finally, if the military was to sustain growth after fort
abandonment, we would expect the coefficient of FORT_PRE1890 to be positive
as well.
The results for the land improvement growth equation are presented in
Table 5. We find that local population growth, local manufacturing growth, and
the acquisition of a rail line increased growth in land development. We find, as
expected, that higher productive yields in 1880, ceteris paribus, tend to slow land
development. Finally, we find that the initial presence of a military fort has no
statistical impact on the growth of land development.
Turning attention to the growth in the number of farms, Table 6, we find
that farm growth was deterred by increases in population and manufacturing,
contrary to the results presented in Table 5. This is likely due to a crowding out
effect; the more population and manufacturing, the less land available for new
farms. We also find, consistent with Table 5, that gaining rail access, ceteris
paribus, did foster some farm growth. However, we find that the initial presence
of a fort did not support continued farm development. Indeed, since our measure
of farm growth is in fact net farm growth, some of the farms from 1880 failed by
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1890, thus slowing the overall growth in farms over the period. Apparently, even
the presence of a military establishment could not salvage the nation’s land
disposal policies.23
VI.

Conclusion

In this paper we empirically investigated the relationship between
agricultural development in Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado and proximity to
military forts in 1880. We find that, ceteris paribus, agricultural investments are
substantially higher in those counties where a military fort is present, suggesting
that military forts had a stimulating impact on agricultural development in the
Great Plains. However, the reverse is not true. There is no statistical support for
the notion that forts necessarily located in counties where substantial investment
already occurred. Moreover, we found that while the presence of a military fort
has the effect of increasing agricultural development, there is no evidence that
such a presence sustained agricultural development.
While federal expenditures on military support appear to have had an
immediate impact on agricultural investments in land, capital and labor, it was not
sustained. As a result, it is entirely possible that the presence of a fort prompted
more investment that would otherwise have been warranted, suggesting that in the
23

In and ideal world, it would be of value to look specifically at farm failure (and new farm
additions). Indeed, it would be of interest to consider more directly the impact of military forts and
farm failures. In light of the evidence presented here, it is likely that the presence of a nearby fort
would not have delayed farm failures by much, if at all. Nonetheless, it would be useful to
investigate this. However, such data is not available from the Census. We leave this for future
research.
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end, not only could farm establishment growth not be sustained, more resources
were devoted to such development that would be socially optimal.
There are several avenues of future research. For instance, a richer
exploration of the determinants of fort locations would be an interesting exercise.
Moreover, a breakdown of the determinants of farm failures and new farm
formation specifically would offer some additional insights to the results
presented in our Table 6. Finally, it would be of interest to compare these results
to fort locations in and the development of mining operations in the nineteenth
century and compare with the results we have found here for agricultural
development. These we leave for future research.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable
ACIMP
YLD*
POP/FARMS
POPST/FARMST
MAN_EMP/POP
RR1876
FORT
NEARFORT

ACRES/FARMS **
DMY98 **
RIVER **

ACIMP1890 (2)
POP1890/FARMS1890 (2)
POPST1890/FARMST1890 (2)
MAN_EMP1890/POP1890 (2)
RR_ADDED (4, 6)
FORT_PRE1890 (5)

ACIMP1870 (2)
FORT_POST1870 (5)

Definition
Ratio of improved acres to total acres (1)
Ratio of the number of bushels produced of
agricultural products to total acres planted (1)
Ratio of county population to number of farms (1,2)
Ratio of state (minus county i) population to state
(minus county i) farms (1,2)
Ratio of county manufacturing employment to
population (2)
dummy variable = 1 if county had a railroad present as
of 1876, 0 otherwise (6)
dummy variable = 1 if county had a fort operating in
1880, 0 otherwise (5)
dummy variable = 1 if a oucnty boardering a county i
had an operating fort in 1880, 0 otherwise (5)

Mean
0.471
5.734

Standard Deviation
0.225
4.829

10.357
10.070

17.329
9.975

0.036

0.118

0.539

0.500

0.073

0.260

0.255

0.437

Ratio of county total acres in farms to farms (1)
dummy variable = 1 if county was east of the 98
meridian, 0 otherwise (6)
dummy variable = 1 if county had a river, 0 otherwise
(6)

179.921
0.606

82.749
0.490

0.788

0.410

Ratio of improved acres to total acres in 1890 (3)
Ratio of county population to farms in 1890 (4)
Ratio of state (minus county i) population to state
(minus county i) farms in 1890 (4)
Ratio of county manufacturing employment to
population in 1890 (4)
dummy variable = 1 if county had a railroad added by
1895, 0 otherwise (6,7)
dummy variable = 1 if county had a fort as of 1880
that closed before 1890 (5)

0.694
16.949
11.159

0.192
51.605
5.660

0.014

0.019

0.477

0.501

0.063

0.243

Ratio of improved acres to total acres in 1870 (
)
dummy variable = 1 if county had a fort built after
1870 (5)

0.297

0.175

0.028

0.167

*Note: the agricultural products were barley,
buckwheat, corn, oats, rye, and wheat.
**Note: these variables were used in the initial stage
of the TSLS procedure to sepecify YLD.
(1) Tenth Decennial Census of the United States 1880:
Volume III: Report on the Production of Agriculture,
Table 7.
(2) Tenth Decennial Census of the United States 1880:
Volume I: Statistics of Population, Table 3.
(3) Eleventh Decennial Census of the United States,
1890: Volume X: Report on Statistics of Agriculture,
Table 14.
(4) Eleventh Decennial Census of the United States,
1890: POPULATION
(5) Hart (1963, 1964)
(6) Rand McNally's Pioneer Atlas of the American
West, 1969 Edition, Rand McNally & Company.
(7) Data can be found at
http://www.livgenmi.com/1895/
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix
YLD
POP/FARMS
POPST/FARMST

YLD

POP/FARMS

POPST/FARMST

RR1876

FORT

1.00

-0.11

-0.19

0.41

-0.06

-0.02

1.00

0.34

0.17

0.12

1.00

0.18

0.09

1.00

RR1876
FORT
NEARFORT

NEARFORT MAN_EMP/
POP

DMYNE

DMYKS

-0.25

0.19

-0.08

-0.09

0.14

-0.03

-0.17

0.09

-0.05

-0.23

-0.31

0.17

0.09

-0.20

-0.09

-0.01

1.00

-0.16

-0.05

-0.08

0.03

1.00

MAN_EMP/POP
DMYNE
DMYKS

0.07

-0.12

0.07

1.00

-0.11

0.13

1.00

-0.85
1.00
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Table 3. Logit TSLS Results, 1880
Dependent variable: ln(ACIMP/(1-ACIMP))
N = 163
variable
Constant
ln(YLD)
Ln(POP/FARMS)
Ln(POPST/FARMST)
RR1876
FORT
NEARFORT
Ln(MAN_EMP/POP)
DMYNE
DMYKS

coeff.
-41.342
0.750
0.261
10.576
0.307
0.339
0.137
0.065
18.951
18.957

Adj. R-squared
F-stat.

0.683
38.250

p-value
0.077
0.000
0.346
0.078
0.000
0.052
0.126
0.151
0.092
0.090

sig.
*
***
*
***
*

*
*
***

* - Significant at the 10 percent level.
** - Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** - Significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 4. Binary Probit results for Kansas and Nebraska counties
Dependent variable: FORT_POST1870
N = 106
variable
Constant
Ln(ACIMP1870)
LOG(ACIMP/ACIMP1870)
DMYKS

coeff.
-0.149
3.261
2.437
0.255

McFadden R-squared

0.198
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p-value
0.894
0.137
0.255
0.676

Table 5. TSLS Results for change in land improvements between 1880 and 1890
Dependent variable: ln(ACIMP1890/ACIMP)
N=162

variable
C
Ln(YLD)
Ln((POP1890/FARMS1890)/(POP/FARMS))
Ln((POPST1890/FARMST1890)/(POPST/FARMST))
RR_ADDED
FORT_PRE1890
Ln((MAN_EMP1890/POP1890)/(MAN_EMP/POP))
DMYNE
DMYKS

coeff.
-5.938
-0.301
0.820
-10.751
0.199
-0.148
0.079
9.484
8.471

Adj. R-squared
F-stat.

0.490
21.672

Estimated using White's Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
* - Significant at the 10 percent level.
** - Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
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p-value
0.208
0.000
0.000
0.180
0.007
0.357
0.057
0.167
0.166

sig.
***
***
***
*

***

Table 6. TSLS Results for change in the number of farms between 1880 and 1890
Dependent variable: ln(FARMS1890/FARMS)
N=162

variable
C
Ln(YLD)
Ln((POP1890/FARMS1890)/(POP/FARMS))
Ln((POPST1890/FARMST1890)/(POPST/FARMST))
RR_ADDED
FORT_PRE1890
Ln((MAN_EMP1890/POP1890)/(MAN_EMP/POP))
DMYNE
DMYKS

coeff.
-6.322
-0.050
-1.079
-12.098
0.154
-0.156
-0.251
10.406
8.963

Adj. R-squared
F-stat.

0.671
31.326

Estimated using White's Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
* - Significant at the 10 percent level.
** - Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
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p-value
0.034
0.316
0.000
0.021
0.095
0.188
0.000
0.017
0.022

sig.

***
**
*
***
**
**

***

